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Abstract
This paper describes how formal methods were used to produce evidence in a certiﬁcation, based on the
Common Criteria, of a security-critical software system. The evidence included a top level speciﬁcation
(TLS) of the security-relevant software behavior, a formal statement of the required security properties,
proofs that the speciﬁcation satisﬁed the properties, and a demonstration that the source code, which
had been annotated with preconditions and postconditions, was a reﬁnement of the TLS. The paper also
describes those aspects of our approach which were most eﬀective and research that could signiﬁcantly
increase the eﬀectiveness of formal methods in software certiﬁcation.
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1 Introduction
Prior to its deployment, a security-critical software system may undergo a formal
certiﬁcation to demonstrate that it satisﬁes critical security properties. Although
formal methods are part of the standard recommendations for developing and certi-
fying security-critical systems, how to integrate formal methods into the certiﬁcation
process is, in large part, unclear. Especially challenging is how to demonstrate that
the end product of software development—the code—behaves securely. This paper
describes the formal methods and tools that our group applied to produce evidence
for the certiﬁcation, based on the Common Criteria, of a security-critical software
system. It also describes the most eﬀective aspects of our approach for certiﬁca-
tion and research that could signiﬁcantly increase the utility of formal methods in
software certiﬁcation.
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2 Background
A group of international organizations established the Common Criteria to provide
a single basis for evaluating the security of information technology products [5]. Re-
cently, our group prepared evidence to support the certiﬁcation, based on the Com-
mon Criteria, of a security-critical, embedded software device called ED (Embedded
Device). Required in the certiﬁcation were 1) a formal proof of correspondence be-
tween a formal speciﬁcation of ED’s security functions and its required security
properties and 2) a demonstration that ED’s code satisﬁed the formal speciﬁcation.
The device of interest, ED, processes data in an embedded system whose memory
has been divided into non-overlapping partitions. Because it stores and processes
data classiﬁed at diﬀerent security levels, security violations by ED could cause sig-
niﬁcant damage. To prevent violations of data separation, e.g., the “leaking” of data
from one memory partition to another, the ED design uses a separation kernel [16],
a tamper-proof, non-bypassable program which mediates access to memory. By
mediating every memory access, the kernel ensures that every access is authorized
and that every transfer of data from one memory location to another is authorized.
Any attempted memory access by ED that is unauthorized will cause an exception.
3 Our Approach to Certiﬁcation
To provide a foundation for proving the security of ED, the code implementing the
separation kernel was annotated with preconditions and postconditions in the style
of Hoare and Floyd. The evidence we produced to demonstrate that ED enforces
data separation included a Top Level Speciﬁcation (TLS) of the separation-relevant
behavior of the kernel, a formal statement of data separation, and a mechanized
formal proof that the TLS satisﬁes data separation. In addition, we partitioned
the annotated code into three categories, each requiring a diﬀerent proof strategy.
Finally, we established the formal correspondence between the annotated code and
the TLS.
Given 1) source code annotated with preconditions and postconditions and 2) a
security property of interest, the overall problem is how to establish that the code
satisﬁes the property. We developed a ﬁve-step process for establishing the property.
These ﬁve steps are described next.
3.1 Formulate a Top Level Speciﬁcation
The purpose of the Top Level Speciﬁcation (TLS) is to provide a precise, yet under-
standable description of the security-relevant behavior of the code and to make ex-
plicit the assumptions on which the security of the code is based. 3 In our approach,
the TLS is represented in precise natural language as a state machine model, using
the style of [12]. The advantage of precise natural language is that it enables stake-
holders with diﬀering backgrounds and objectives—the project manager, software
3 For example, the assumptions for ED make explicit those routines that the certiﬁcation authority agreed
were outside the scope of the formal veriﬁcation.
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developers, evaluators, and the formal methods team—to communicate precisely
about the required kernel behavior and helps ensure, early in the veriﬁcation pro-
cess, that misunderstandings are weeded out and issues resolved. Another purpose
of the TLS is to provide a formal context and precise vocabulary for deﬁning data
separation. For the details of the TLS for the ED kernel, see [10].
3.2 Formally Represent the Security Properties
In our approach, the required security properties are formally expressed as prop-
erties of the state machine model that underlies the TLS. To enforce the required
security property (data separation), ED must prevent data in a partition i from
inﬂuencing or being inﬂuenced by 1) data in a partition j, where i = j, or 2) data
in an earlier conﬁguration of partition i. To formally represent data separation,
we formulated a number of properties in precise natural language. Examples of
the properties are No-Exfiltration, which states that data processing in any par-
tition j cannot inﬂuence data stored outside the partition, and No-Infiltration,
which states that data processing in any partition i is not inﬂuenced by data outside
that partition.
3.3 Apply a Mechanical Prover
To demonstrate that the TLS satisﬁes the security properties of interest, the TLS
and the properties are translated into the language of a theorem prover and the
prover applied to prove formally that the TLS satisﬁes the properties. To formally
verify that the TLS for the ED kernel enforces data separation, the natural language
formulation of the TLS and the properties that represent data separation were
translated into TAME (Timed Automata Modeling Environment) [3], a front-end
to PVS [14], and TAME proofs were interactively constructed to show that the
TAME speciﬁcation satisﬁes each property.
3.4 Partition the Code
To show formally that the system is secure, we prove that the system code is a reﬁne-
ment of the state machine that underlies the TLS. For ED, our proof of reﬁnement
is based on a demonstration that all kernel code falls into three major categories:
Event Code, Trusted Code, and Other Code (see [10] for details). Partitioning the
code dramatically reduces the cost of code veriﬁcation since only Event Code, a
small part of the code, must be checked for conformance to the TLS. In ED, Event
Code and Trusted Code comprised less than 10% of the code. The remaining 90%
was Other Code.
3.5 Demonstrate Code Conformance
The ﬁnal step is to show that each category of code is secure. To demonstrate
that the kernel’s Event Code is secure (i.e., does not violate data separation), we
constructed two mappings: 1) a mapping from the Event Code to the TLS events
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and from the code states to the states in the TLS, and 2) a mapping from precondi-
tions and postconditions in the TLS events to the preconditions and postconditions
that annotate the corresponding Event Code. We demonstrated separately that
Trusted Code and Other Code were benign. Based on these results, we concluded
that the kernel code reﬁnes the TLS. Because in step 3, we proved that the TLS
satisﬁes the properties that guarantee data separation and because each property
is preserved under reﬁnement, we may conclude that the kernel code is secure. For
details, see [10].
4 What Worked
4.1 Use of Natural Language
During certiﬁcation, the natural language representation of the TLS enabled the
evaluators to communicate easily with the formal methods team and others, thus
ensuring that misunderstandings were avoided and issues resolved early in the cer-
tiﬁcation process. The natural language representation of the TLS for ED contrasts
with the representations used in other formal speciﬁcations of secure systems. These
speciﬁcations are often expressed in specialized languages such as ACL-2 (see, e.g,
[8]). Any ambiguity in the natural language representation of the kernel behavior
was removed by translating the TLS into TAME, since the state machine semantics
underlying TAME is expressed as a PVS theory.
4.2 Use of Scenarios to Understand Requirements
One signiﬁcant challenge was to understand the security-relevant behavior of the ED
kernel. To accomplish this, we designed several scenarios, i.e., sequences of events,
and executed them using the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) simulator [11]. As
expected, designing and executing the scenarios exposed gaps in our understanding
of the kernel behavior. Discussing the issues raised by the scenarios with ED’s
development team helped deepen our understanding of the required kernel behavior.
4.3 Application of a Mechanical Prover
TAME’s speciﬁcation and proof support signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed the veriﬁcation ef-
fort. Using TAME rather than hand proofs not only reduced the time required to
complete the proofs, it also avoided some disadvantages of hand proofs, such as
overlooking one or more cases.
4.4 Application of Reﬁnement
For the approach in Section 3 to succeed, a security property must be preserved
under reﬁnement. It is well-known that safety (but not liveness) properties are
preserved under reﬁnement [1]. Hence, our techniques may be used to guaran-
tee security properties that are safety properties. It is easy to show that all se-
curity properties veriﬁed for ED, except one, are safety properties and therefore
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preserved by reﬁnement. It is also easy to show that the one non-safety property,
No-Infiltration, is also preserved under reﬁnement.
5 Needed Research
5.1 Automatic Checking and Derivation of Code Annotations
For many years, researchers have recommended annotating code with precondition,
postconditions, and invariants (see, e.g., [13]). Such code annotations are already
used in practice: Developers at Praxis annotate SPARK programs with assertions
and use tools to automatically check the assertions [4]. Moreover, in the largest
Microsoft product groups, annotations are a mandated part of the software devel-
opment process [6]. Unfortunately, manual annotation of source code remains rare
in the wider software industry because it is highly labor-intensive [9]. To address
this problem, Amtoft et al. have developed new techniques for checking and for de-
riving annotations from SPARK programs [2]. Tools for checking and deriving code
annotation for programs written in other languages, such as C, would be extremely
useful.
5.2 Automatic Generation of Tests from Assertions.
Many new techniques for constructing tests from formal speciﬁcations have been
proposed. Such techniques (see, e.g., [7]) derive a set of test cases from a formal
speciﬁcation and use them to test the given program. One promising new approach
constructs test cases from preconditions and postconditions and uses the test cases
to check that the given program satisﬁes the asserted preconditions and postcondi-
tions. Validating source code in this manner should provide high assurance of both
the security and functional correctness of source code. Reference [20] describes an
approach that uses automatic test generation from preconditions and postcondi-
tions to ﬁnd bugs in Java code. Similar research is needed that uses tests generated
from an annotated program written in another language, such as C, to check the
program for errors.
5.3 A Code Conformance Proof Assistant
The semantic distance between the abstract TLS required in a formal certiﬁcation
and a low-level program, such as a C program, is huge. While the TLS describes
the security-relevant program behavior in terms of sets, functions, and relations,
the description of the concrete program behavior is in terms of low-level constructs,
such as arrays, integers, and bits stored in registers and memory areas. Hence,
automatic demonstration of conformance of low level C code to a TLS may be
unrealistic. A more realistic goal may be a proof assistant with two inputs, a C
program annotated with assertions and a TLS of the security-relevant functions of
that program. The assistant would help a user show conformance between the C
program and the TLS.
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5.4 Automatic Code Generation
One promising way to obtain high assurance that an implementation satisﬁes critical
security properties is to generate code automatically from a speciﬁcation that has
been proven to satisfy the properties. Automatic code generation is already feasible
for some low-level speciﬁcation languages such as Esterel [18]. While constructing
eﬃcient source code from more abstract speciﬁcations is possible for simple program
constructs using simple data types (see, e.g., [15]), new research is needed to produce
eﬃcient code from speciﬁcations containing richer constructs and data types. Such
technology could drastically reduce the eﬀort required to produce eﬃcient code and
provide high assurance that the code satisﬁes critical security properties.
6 Conclusions
One valuable byproduct of applying formal methods in software certiﬁcation is
that the process produces a formal speciﬁcation of the required software behavior.
Developing this speciﬁcation has at least two beneﬁts: 1) a formal speciﬁcation
can be invaluable when a new version of the software is developed, and 2) the
process of developing a formal speciﬁcation by itself may expose errors. Regarding
the second point, the DO-178B certiﬁcation standard for avionics software requires
testing based on the Modiﬁed Condition Decision Coverage (MCDC) test criterion.
However, to build MCDC tests, a formal speciﬁcation must ﬁrst be built. It has
been observed that building this speciﬁcation in itself uncovers software errors [17].
This paper has described one approach to applying formal methods in the cer-
tiﬁcation of software. Building on existing software certiﬁcation standards, such as
DO-178B and the Common Criteria, more and improved approaches which use for-
mal methods in software certiﬁcation are needed. Applying these new approaches
should have many beneﬁts—the exposure of errors that, without formal methods,
might not have been detected; software that has high assurance of satisfying critical
security and safety properties; and the existence of a formal speciﬁcation that would
not have been built otherwise.
References
[1] Abadi, M. and L. Lamport, The existence of reﬁnement mappings, Theoretical Computer Science 82
(1991), pp. 253–284.
[2] Amtoft, T., J. Hatcliﬀ, E. Rodrguez, Robby, J. Hoag and D. Greve, Speciﬁcation and checking of
software contracts for conditional information ﬂow, Technical report (2007).
[3] Archer, M., C. L. Heitmeyer and E. Riccobene, Proving invariants of I/O automata with TAME,
Autom. Softw. Eng. 9 (2002), pp. 201–232.
[4] Barnes, J., “High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security,” Addison-Wesley,
2003.
[5] Common criteria for information technology security evaluation, Parts 1–3, Technical Report CCIMB-
2004-01-001 through CCIMB-2004-01-003, Version 2.2, Revision 256 (2004).
[6] Das, M., Formal speciﬁcations on industrial-strength code – From myth to reality, in: Proc., Computer-
Aided Veriﬁcation (CAV 2006), Seattle, WA, 2006.
C.L. Heitmeyer / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 238 (2009) 3–98
[7] Gargantini, A. and C. L. Heitmeyer, Using model checking to generate tests from requirements
speciﬁcations, in: O. Nierstrasz and M. Lemoine, editors, ESEC/FSE’99, 7th Eur. Software Engineering
Conf. and 7th ACM SIGSOFT Symp. on Foundations of Software Engineering, Toulouse, France,
Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1687 (1999).
[8] Greve, D., M. Wilding and W. M. Vanﬂeet, A separation kernel formal security policy, in: Fourth
International Workshop on the ACL2 Prover and Its Applications (ACL2-2003), 2003.
[9] Hallem, S., B. Chelf, Y. Xie and D. R. Engler, A system and language for building system-speciﬁc,
static analyses, in: PLDI, 2002, pp. 69–82.
[10] Heitmeyer, C., M. Archer, E. Leonard and J. McLean, Applying formal methods to a certiﬁably secure
software system, IEEE Trans. Software Engineering 34 (2008), pp. 82–98.
[11] Heitmeyer, C. L., M. Archer, R. Bharadwaj and R. D. Jeﬀords, Tools for constructing requirements
speciﬁcations: The SCR toolset at the age of ten, Comput. Syst. Sci. Eng. 20 (2005).
[12] Landwehr, C. E., C. L. Heitmeyer and J. D. McLean, A security model for military message systems,
ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 2 (1984), pp. 198–222.
[13] Meyer, B., Applying ‘design by contract’, IEEE Computer 25 (1992), pp. 40–51.
[14] Owre, S., J. Rushby, N. Shankar and F. von Henke, Formal veriﬁcation for fault-tolerant architectures:
Prolegomena to the design of PVS, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 21 (1995), pp. 107–125.
[15] Rothamel, T., C. Heitmeyer, E. Leonard and Y. A. Liu, Generating optimized code from SCR
speciﬁcations, in: Proc., ACM SIGPLAN/SIGBED Conf. on Languages, Compilers and Tools for
Embedded Systems (LCTES 2006), Ottawa, Canada, 2006.
[16] Rushby, J., Design and veriﬁcation of secure systems, in: Proceedings, 8th ACM Symp. on Operating
System Principles, 1981.
[17] Rushby, J. (2006).
[18] SCADE Tool Suite. Tools and documentation available at http://www.esterel-technologies.com/
products/scade-suite.
[19] Schneider, F. B., Enforceable security policies, ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 3 (2000), pp. 30–50.
[20] Smaragdakis, Y. and C. Csallner, Combining static and dynamic reasoning for bug detection, in: Tests
and Proofs, First International Conference, TAP 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4454
(2007), pp. 1–16.
C.L. Heitmeyer / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 238 (2009) 3–9 9
